Benzoni, Francisco. “The Moral Worth of Creatures: Neo-Classical Metaphysics and the Value Theories of Rolston and Callicott.” Environmental Values 18, no. 1 (2009): 5–32. doi: 10.3197/096327109X404717. Republished by the Environment & Society Portal, Multimedia Library. http://www.environmentandsociety.org/node/7493.
After showing that Rolston’s and Callicott’s value theories are fundamentally flawed, I demonstrate that a value theory grounded in neoclassical, or process, metaphysics avoids the problems in, and incorporates insights from, these accounts. A fundamental thesis of neoclassical metaphysics is that individual creatures at all levels of reality (from non-sensuous, non-conscious to self-conscious) are subjects of experience. Since individuals are subjects, this value theory meets Callicott’s legitimate demand that value requires a valuer. And because such subjectivity does not depend on consciousness, this theory meets Rolston’s legitimate demand that intrinsic value does not depend upon human valuation.
— Text from The White Horse Press website
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