



Environment & Society



White Horse Press

Full citation:

van Tatenhove, Jan P.M., and Pieter Leroy. "Environment and Participation in a Context of Political Modernisation."

Environmental Values 12, no. 2, (2003): 155-174.

<http://www.environmentandsociety.org/node/5881>

Rights:

All rights reserved. © The White Horse Press 2003. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purpose of criticism or review, no part of this article may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical or other means, including photocopying or recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the publisher. For further information please see <http://www.whpress.co.uk/>

Environment and Participation in a Context of Political Modernisation

JAN P.M. VAN TATENHOVE

*Department of Political Science
University of Amsterdam
Oudezijds Achterburgwal 237
1012 DL Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Email: vantatenhove@pscw.uva.nl*

PIETER LEROY

*Political Sciences of the Environment
University of Nijmegen
P.O. Box 9108
6500 HK Nijmegen, The Netherlands
Email: p.leroy@nsm.kun.nl*

ABSTRACT

This article discusses the relation between environment and participation in the context of different stages of political modernisation. We focus on the dynamics of environmental policy on the one hand, and the organisation of political participation on the other. The central argument is that participation is inextricably linked to environmental issues, but that their relation differs substantially over the various stages of the institutionalisation of environmental policy. While in the 1970s supplementary forms of participation dominated, the *societalisation* and *marketisation* of environmental policies from the late 1980s has given rise to new opportunities for participation, implying a more rule-altering potential.

KEY WORDS

Environmental policy, political participation, policy arrangements, political modernisation

1. INTRODUCTION

The beginning of the institutionalisation of modern environmental politics in western countries dates from the late 1960s and early 1970s. During this period environmental issues emerged on societal and political agendas. At the same time attempts were made to improve practices of political participation. Both the environmental issue and the improvement of political participation were an expression of the anti-modern critique on 'modern society'. In this article we focus on the interrelation between participation and environmental policy making within a context of political modernisation. More specifically, we look at the impact of recent changes within the domain of environmental policy upon both the debates and the practices of political participation. The central argument in this article is that participation is inextricably linked to environmental issues and can be considered both as an indicator and a motor for political change. The environmental policy domain thus functions as a laboratory for experiments with the nature of political participation.

To understand the changing discourses on political participation and the different ways of organising participation practices in environmental policy over time, we developed the concepts of *political modernisation* and *policy arrangements*. The essence of our approach is as follows: as a result of processes of political modernisation the substance and organisation of environmental policy have changed over time, resulting in the plurality and co-existence of traditional and innovative policy arrangements. The innovation of environmental politics resulting in these new policy arrangements is provoked by the emergence of new coalitions between actors, by the launching of new policy discourses, or by the capacity of actors to mobilise resources and to change and define the rules of the game. Simultaneously, these innovative environmental policy arrangements are illustrative of a general shift from primarily state-initiated regulatory strategies towards new styles and practices of governance, in which polycentric networks of actors appear to aim at the building of common visions. International campaigns such as Local Agenda 21, initiated at the Rio 92 summit, support this renewal. At the same time, though, traditional styles of governance still prevail in some domains of environmental policy making.

The innovation of environmental policy making in these new arrangements has also affected the issue of *political participation*, as issues surrounding participation were frequently the catalyst for such innovation. In general the participation of citizens, non-governmental organisations, firms and other stakeholders changed from reactive to more reflexive and pro-active ways of participation, and from legislative procedures towards extra-legal processes, often resulting in experiments with participatory (or interactive) policy making. At the same time, in other cases political participation practices have remained very traditional.

Our analysis focuses on the interrelation between participation and environmental policy making. First, we discuss the transformations within environmental policy making which have arisen as the result of the interplay between structural societal and political transformations on one hand and innovations in day-to-day policy making on the other. Second, we discuss the transformations in participation at different stages of the gradual institutionalisation of environmental policy, resulting in interactive policy making, forms of deliberative democracy and new ways of governance. In the third section, we focus on contemporary processes concerning the societalisation and marketisation of environmental politics, and their implications for political participation. Throughout, we pay attention to the co-existence of quite different discourses and practices on political participation, some of them 'late modern', but some reflecting rather earlier stages of political modernisation. In conclusion, we reflect on the relation between environmental politics and participation.

2. POLICY ARRANGEMENTS, POLITICAL MODERNISATION AND PARTICIPATION

We understand the dynamics of environmental politics and policy as related to the duality between structural processes of social and political change on one hand, and to interactions between actors in day-to-day policy processes on the other. We intend to analyse the changing practices of participation with the aid of two concepts: *political modernisation* and *policy arrangements* (Van Tatenhove, 1999; Van Tatenhove, Arts and Leroy, 2000).

Political Modernisation

In order to understand change and stability in a policy domain it is necessary to combine an analysis of strategic conduct with an institutional analysis, since both strategic conduct and institutional factors may lead to the renewal of politics and policies – or hamper such a change. The concept of *political modernisation* refers to processes of transformation within the political domain of society. The actual demarcation of 'the political domain' of society depends on the degree of insulation of the subsystems state, market and civil society. In a situation where a clear distinction between state, civil society and market exists, the position of the political domain will be predominantly defined in terms of the rationales of the state. However, contemporary societies show increasing encroachment, interweaving and interference of the three subsystems and demarcation lines become rather vague. Therefore we use a broad concept of the 'political domain' (cf. Held, 1989). Essentially, the political domain of society is the setting in which different agencies and organisations (from state, market and civil society)

produce and distribute resources (power and domination) and meaning (discourses) to shape public life.

To grasp the dynamics of the process of political modernisation we distinguish analytically between three 'phases', respectively labelled as 'early', 'anti-' and 'late' (cf. Alexander, 1995). Each of these three can be characterised by specific, ideal-typical relations between state, market and civil society, and by dominant discourses on governance. Therefore, each of these three relates to certain, predominant policy practices (or arrangements).

Early modernisation is characterised by great optimism about the possibility of progress by the application of rationality, on a steering and responsible state, and on the state's capacity to solve societal problems by rational policy making and comprehensive planning. Its basic beliefs are reflected in the characteristics of early environmental politics: state-initiated, taking scientifically deduced standards as goals, and presuming loyalty from both market and civil society in its actual implementation.

Anti-modernisation, in contrast, refers to scepticism about this scientific optimism, or even to severe criticism of it that emphasises its one-sided, one-dimensional character, the limits of rationality, and the (unforeseen and neglected) external effects of a series of political decisions which affect, among others, the environment and the Third World. Or, as Alexander (1995) puts it, anti-modernisation was a reaction to the unsolved 'reality problems' of the modernisation project, such as inequity and inequality, poverty and starvation, dictatorship and post-colonialism. The anti-modernist discourse was launched by a variety of authors and by the new social movements from the late 1960s and early 1970s, focusing on issues such as inequality, emancipation, democracy and participation. The anti-modernist discourse reflects the opposition of (parts of) civil society to what was regarded as a malicious state-market coalition, and in particular to the oppressing role of the state. It is hard to label any politics as 'anti-modernist', and yet one can point at the claims for more participatory politics, resulting, for example, in policy instruments such as environmental impact assessment and involving the input of counter-expertise in some procedures. More than is apparent from concrete instruments and measures, the anti-modernist wave has given a great impetus to policy making, particularly in relation to the participation issue, as we discuss below.

Late modernisation, finally, neither presumes a synoptic rationality nor a single actor's steering capacity. Giddens (1990), Beck (1994, 1996) and other authors on late and reflexive modernity essentially argue that the side-effects of modernisation and the unforeseen consequences of modernity, such as global risks, will structure society and politics (Franklin, 1998). In this view, the side-effects of modernisation, captured by Beck as the emergence of the 'risk society', have become the pivot of governance. First of all because the state can in part be held responsible for the fact that these risks were not properly regulated, the so called 'organised irresponsibility' of the modern state. Secondly, one may argue

that some modern risks cannot be dealt with by the classical, state-centred system of the industrial society. This will lead to the decreasing centrality of the state as a political actor, and to an increasing role for politicisation within other spheres of society. Therefore, late modernisation assumes an increasing interweaving of state, market and civil society, and an inevitable interference and co-operation between their respective agencies, in which the common formulation of the problem and the design of its most adequate solution strategies are part of the policy-making process. These basic features are reflected in a variety of participatory, interactive and deliberative patterns and practices of policy making that we witness throughout contemporary Europe.

The idea of conceiving the phases of political modernisation as consecutive stages in a unilinear development is seductive; and there is, as we have suggested implicitly, an overwhelming amount of empirical evidence to underpin such a stance. However we want to stress the fact that there is both a gradual transition between these stages on the one hand, and a juxtaposition of various types of political modernisation on the other. In other words, 'early' politics can be discerned in contemporary policy processes, and political institutions and practices originating from this period still remain, while paralleled by other, more recently developed styles and practices. In brief, we emphasise the juxtaposition of the three types of political modernisation distinguished, and thereby, the plurality of contemporary politics. Our empirical research in different sub-domains of environmental policy making, such as climate change, infrastructure, nature conservation and agriculture, shows indeed that – contrary to what some scholars suggest – there is no clear, univocal evolutionary path of development from one form of arrangement to another (Van Tatenhove, Arts and Leroy, 2000). At least in environmental policy making, there is no predominant movement away from traditional, (inter)statist arrangements, in which the state plays the dominant role, towards innovative policy arrangements, in which the influence of market and civil society stakeholders has increased. Instead of a unilinear evolution, we establish the juxtaposition and mixture of different types of arrangements. The latter not only differ over time, but there are also quite substantial differences between certain sub-domains of environmental policy making, one can even point some contradictory arrangements within one domain (Pestman, 2000) and, quite obviously, huge differences between different countries can be found (Arts and Van der Zouwen, 1999).

Policy Arrangements

We conceive our second concept, *policy arrangement*, as the temporary stabilisation of both the substance and the organisation of a policy domain. 'Temporary' in what we regard to be an ongoing process of institutionalisation, including its construction, de- and reconstruction. The substantial and organisational characteristics of a policy domain can be analysed on the basis of four

dimensions: policy coalitions, resources, 'rules of the game', and policy discourses. Policy innovations can be initiated from each of these dimensions. Policy agents may decide: (1) to allow more or new actors to participate in policy making or in coalition formation; (2) to reshape power relations, for example by adding to or withdrawing resources from a policy arrangement; (3) to reformulate the rules of the game on the basis of which policies are made; and (4) to reformulate the policy discourse concerned, for example by redefining its core concepts (Arts and Van Tatenhove, 2000). However, innovations in one dimension tend to have consequences for other dimensions, and even for the arrangement as a whole. In other words, in some cases changes have been initiated by new coalitions (e.g. the participation of citizen groups), whereas in other cases they are provoked by innovative discourses, or reinforced by rules and resources, setting off a chain reaction of changes in all aspects. Finally, this chain may lead to the change of *entire* policy arrangements. The concept of policy arrangements helps us to analyse and interpret changes and continuity in (environmental) politics, as we will illustrate in section 3 and 4.

Participation

Both the gradually changing character of policy arrangements over time and their plurality in contemporary environmental politics effect the development of political participation. We define political participation here in general as the involvement of agents, such as citizens or non-governmental organisations, in politics and the process of 'government'. The way actors participate in politics and the process of 'government' depends on the dominant model of democracy. Within the context of this article, though, it is not possible to discuss these models thoroughly. To understand the relation between environment and participation in the context of political modernisation, we discuss only the ideal types of democracy and participation that are likely to be found within each type of political modernisation. In general, early modernisation seems to be linked with classical variants of liberal (representative) democracy, whereas anti-modernisation is linked with variants of direct democracy, and late modernisation tends to be linked to forms of deliberative democracy and sub-politics.

The concept of 'early political modernisation' reflects a relative insulation of state, market and civil society, each sphere functioning according to its own rationales: bureaucracy, competition and solidarity respectively. In this context democracy refers to democratic government, that is, following Warren (1999: 353), arenas of formal state-centred institutions that meet certain requirements, including a representative structure based on a broad franchise, political rights, including freedom of speech and rights to associate, protection for minorities and other related conditions. This liberal conception of democracy essentially takes the form of a cluster of rules and institutions permitting the broadest participation of the majority of citizens in the selection of representatives who alone can make

political decisions (Held, 1996: 119). One can speak of 'constitutionally institutionalised' participation. It includes free and fair elections on the basis of suffrage, freedom of conscience, information and expression, associational autonomy etc.

The 1970s show both a renewal of theories of democracy and the emergence of some radical alternatives. These alternatives focused on new linkages between the state and civil society, corresponding to classical ideas of 'the political community', based on the central principle of justification of direct democracy – that 'free development of all' can only be achieved with the 'free development of each' (Held, 1996: 152) – and the New Left model of democracy referred to as 'participatory democracy' (Held, 1996: 263–73). One of the key features of 'participatory democracy' is the direct participation of citizens in the key institutions of society, including the workplace and the local community. More generally, the anti-modernisation wave promoted supplementary forms of participation to bridge the gap left by constitutionally institutionalised participation. These new forms of participation mainly focused on state–civil society interfaces. The new social movements developed a participation repertoire, ranging from public hearings and debates to demonstrations and the barricading of, for example, nuclear power plants. In addition, classical institutions, such as churches, trade unions, firms, and universities, were confronted with claims for more influence and the emancipation of their members. These forms of participation were said to be supplementary, and thereby 'corrective', to the 'constitutionally institutionalised' forms of participation.

As stated above, the emergence of late political modernisation reflects an increasing encroachment and interference of state, civil society and market, with rather vague demarcation lines between them (Van Tatenhove, Arts and Leroy, 2000: 36). In particular, the decreasing centrality of the state's political role is striking. New ways of governance have (to be) developed within and beyond the nation-state, since the state is incapable of accommodating the new and global risks of contemporary society (e.g. nuclear radiation, the greenhouse effect, the possible impact of genetic modification). On the one hand we witness globalisation – posing huge issues of participation as recently expressed by the anti-globalisation movement. On the other hand, Beck suggests that late political modernisation heralds the sub-politicisation of society, so that society is shaped from below, not only by new coalitions of actors, but also giving rise to a whole arena of hybrid sub-politics. Politics is no longer a privilege of the representative institutions of the nation-state, but also takes place in the supermarket, at schools, in the media, on the street. Sub-politicisation presupposes the intermingling of rule-directed and rule-altering politics. The former functions within the rule-system of the nation state, whereas the latter concerns altering the rules of the game.

These political developments make existing forms of participation inadequate, since they do not anticipate the decreasing role of the nation-state, nor the changing interrelations between state, civil society and market. Classical means

of political participation are mainly based on a kind of passive trust which presupposes a 'thick support' of civil society for a 'strong capacity' of the state (cf. Bang and Sorensen's critique of Putnam in Akkerman, Hajer and Grin, 2000). To overcome this paradoxical situation forms of deliberative democracy (see section 4) and sub-politics have to be developed on the basis of active trust. This change in governance, from participation to deliberation, calls for new participation arrangements.

3. THE GRADUAL INSTITUTIONALISATION OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: 1970–1985

Since the emergence of environmental issues in the 1960s environment and participation have been two inextricable connected expressions of the same 'green discontent' (Lauwers, 1983). Green discontent essentially refers to the protests against environmental harm and the ways in which decisions resulting in such harm were made. In the 1960s and 1970s the green discontent was an anti-modern critique, consisting of two elements. First, a critique of the ignorance of the political and economic establishment about the environmental effects of a series of decisions, e.g. industrial siting or infrastructure, which underpin economic development (industrial zones, airports, highways, harbours, energy plants etc.). This critique focused upon the content (output and outcome) of political decision making. Second, there was critique about the way these decisions had been made: without sufficient participation, in some cases without even properly informing the people concerned, and in other cases overruling their protest by the so-called DAD-strategy (decide, announce, defend). This critique focused upon the process of decision making.

Both critiques, distinguished analytically here, were part of a larger anti-modernist discourse. This also encompassed other side-effects of the established politics of early modernisation (from underdevelopment via the arms race to gender discrimination), and it encompassed processes within the political system, but also at universities, in international relations etc. In brief, the anti-modernist discourse opposed the external effects of both the capitalist system and the state, the latter regarded as either politically oppressing or at least facilitating the former. Authors such as Bahro, Gorz, Illich, Schumacher, Roszak elaborated, albeit in different ways, similar critiques, and fed claims for a new understanding and practice of political participation. The claims of the newly emerging environmental movement were paralleled and even preceded by those of other so-called new social movements, including the civil rights movement (USA), students, anti-Vietnam war, and Third World movement. In fact they formed a discursive coalition protesting (a) against the establishment's ignoring of the external effects of a unilateral emphasis on economic growth and (b) against their autocratic, non-participatory way of decision making.

This double critique led to a double development in environmental politics. First, the critique on political content led, from the early 1970s onwards, to the gradual development and institutionalisation of environmental policies. This included a series of legislative initiatives, the establishment of environmental policy departments, the setting of environmental standards and their implementation in series of permits and environmental planning. It also led to the establishment of such typical features as environmental impact assessment (including cost-benefit analysis and risk assessment) and technology assessment. The latter are typical instruments of the anti-modernist stage of development, since they reflect the claim for countervailing power, e.g. for counter-expertise in environmental decision making.

Secondly, the green discontent criticised the lack of transparency and participation in environmental politics, as reflected in a series of struggles over the siting of hazardous industries, infrastructure and other facilities, nuclear power and alike. Gladwin (1980), Blowers (1984), Leroy (1979) reported on different local conflicts, as Blowers and Leroy (1994) and Gould et al. (1996) have done more recently. Apart from their specific content, the issue at stake in all these environmental conflicts was similar. Decisions that could be expected to substantially affect people, not only in their physical environment, but also with regard to their welfare and well being, were taken without participation, and in some cases even without the active knowledge of those affected.

One can discuss the actual impact of all the protesting. Authors differ in their assessment and appreciation of its influence, either on the substantial issue at stake (Huberts, 1988) or, at a wider level, to politics and participation in general (Lowe, 1983). The series of local conflicts, the increasing protest and opposition, and the gradually more powerful position of environmental groups eventually led to newly set up procedures of consultation and participation. Here, 'new' means different from and complementing classical means of political participation such as general or local elections or party membership. This included the gradual renewal of a series of public law procedures for decision making on physical planning and on environmental permits. They provided new opportunities for both citizens and environmental action groups to interfere in (specific) decision-making processes. However, they primarily, if not exclusively, dealt with state-citizen or state-civil society relations.

The nuclear case, in particular, revealed the shortcomings of these newly designed procedures: they focused on specific, mostly local processes of decision making, whereas the nuclear option was neither a specific nor a local one. They provided opportunities for citizens and citizen groups to oppose political decisions, leaving the influence of other actors, e.g. industrial monopolies (in some cases state-owned) unaffected. Therefore, these new forms of consultation did not provide a legitimate and appropriate way to deal with the nuclear issue.

Apart from those intrinsic restrictions of their scope, the functioning of those newly designed procedures largely depended upon the structural openness of the political system in different countries, which in turn influenced the strategic options of the respective environmental movements. The mutual interdependence between these factors has been partly described by scholars using the so-called 'political opportunity approach', linking structural features of a political system to strategic choices of (one of the) actors within that system (for example Kitschelt, Kriesi, Duyvendak, Van der Heijden). We restrict mention here to a brief overview of three countries based on Boehmer-Christiansen, 1991; Weale, 1992; Hajer, 1997; Van Tatenhove, Arts and Leroy, 2000.

In Germany the environmentalist movement was part of a more encompassing opposition movement (*Ausserparlamentarische Opposition*) that largely dominated the political scene of the 1970s. Neither the United Kingdom nor the Netherlands experienced such a radical environmentalism. The German environmental movement did not succeed in getting entry to the established political arenas nor did it get real political influence on actual decision making, whether on nuclear power, airport enlargement or anything else. This lack of access and influence was caused by and in turn reinforced the political radicalism of the environmental movement, particularly during the great coalition of German Christian- and Social Democrats. In the late 1970s the political radicalisation of the environmental movement resulted in the establishment of the Green Party. Their successful electoral campaigns – and the impact of the Chernobyl accident that eventually led to the establishment of a new ministry – forced the traditional parties and the state to develop a more comprehensive environmental policy.

The British environmental movement, unlike its German counterpart, had a very small 'deep ecology' component that never reached the apogee of the German 'fundi's'. Apart from some specific and occasionally violent local and regional environmental conflicts (particularly over nuclear issues), environmental issues were only partly politicised in the UK. During the 1980s the environmental movement had a limited influence on the agenda setting of, for instance, acid rain or nuclear power. This again was partly the result of the national institutional setting, in this case the British two-party political system. On top of that, during the 1980s 'classical' political and economic issues regarding the competencies and responsibilities of state, market and civil society dominated the political agenda. They related to the future of the mining industry, the position of the trade unions, the public health service, local government and the privatisation of a series of national industries and services.

In the Netherlands the environmental movement has quite a different position. In the consensus tradition of Dutch policy making the environmental movement, right from its emergence in the early 1970s, was frequently consulted about many environmental issues. In fact there is a remarkable relationship between the movement and the Ministry of the Environment, especially from the

1980s onwards, as the environmental movement became a natural ally of the Ministry of the Environment. Not only were environmental groups subsidised, they were also invited to contribute to the policy-making process itself. Only the nuclear power debate led to some kind of radicalisation of parts of the environmental movement. Within Dutch consensus politics, an opposition strategy is unlikely to be successful. Since the 1990s onwards the agenda setting and management of environmental issues is subjected to more or less formalised negotiations between political parties, the administration, target groups and the environmental movement by a new version of Dutch consensus politics: 'the green polder model'.

In brief, the claims made by the anti-modernists in the 1970s led to some additional participatory features in the environmental policy domain. The environmental movement played a key role in both advocating and making use of them, adopting an intermediary role between politics and citizens, thereby accentuating specific interrelations between state and civil society. However, the newly designed participatory infrastructure was limited to that interrelation, and primarily conceived as a supplement (not a corrective) to representative democracy, without affecting the roles and power positions of other agencies. This seemed plausible in an era in which policy making was regarded as the responsibility of the state, with the market and particularly civil society conceived to be the mere objects of steering.

4. THE *SOCIETALISATION* AND *MARKETISATION* OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS AND THEIR IMPACT UPON (THE INNOVATION OF) PARTICIPATION

Over the last three decades several European countries have witnessed transformations of the institutions of democracy and, as a consequence, of the meaning of political participation. Among the most significant developments have been the erosion of the traditional bases of power of the democratic institutions of the nation-state and the emergence of a diversity of alternative policy arrangements. The institutional capacity of traditional democratic and governance mechanisms have been challenged by globalisation, by the transnationalisation of economic, social and cultural relationships and by the horizontalisation of politics, through which the accepted authority of the state by firms, citizens and subnational governments has been eroded.

In the literature these transformations have been captured in terms of a shift from 'government' to 'governance'. On the one hand there is a shift in the focus of democratic politics and practices, from hierarchical and well-institutionalised forms of government towards less formalised practices of governance, in which state-authority makes way for an appreciation in politics of mutual interdepend-

ence. On the other hand there is a shift in the locus of democratic politics: governance at subnational and supranational levels is gaining importance *vis à vis* the national level.

Governance refers to 'sustaining co-ordination and coherence among a wide variety of actors with different purposes and objectives, such as political actors and institutions, corporate interests, civil society and transnational organisations' (Pierre, 2000: 3–4). In this article we focus on governance as a society-centred practice, in which the focus is on co-ordination and self governance, manifested in different types of arrangements (cf. Hirst, 2000; Sbragia, 2000). Society-centred types of governance, like New Public Management and multi-level governance, take as a starting point the observation of an increasing encroachment and interference of state, civil society and market. Recently this type of governance has been linked to the notion of 'deliberative democracy' (Cohen, 1998; Warren, 1999; Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003). Essential for deliberative democracy are public reasoning and deliberation, which refer to argumentative consultation and a collective learning process in which participants (e.g. citizens, governments, NGOs) are not representatives of specific interests, but are aiming at correcting and reconsidering each other points of view. The ultimate aim is the formulation of a common understanding.

These transformations have also affected the institutionalisation of environmental politics. As in other policy domains, environmental policy is confronted with the shift from government to governance, in which the roles and positions of the state, the market, and civil society have been redefined, reflecting the gradual institutionalisation of 'interference zones' between these subsystems. As a consequence, the meaning and character of the participation of citizens, of the environmental movement, of business firms, has changed. Society is no longer seen as something separate from the state that can be governed by it. Instead, the subsystems of civil society and market and their respective agencies are now conceptualised in terms of 'networks', 'associations', 'public-private partnership' and the like, in which the state negotiates with non-state agencies, either from the market or society, in order to formulate and implement an effective and legitimate policy.

Hereafter we restrict our discussion to Dutch environmental politics and policies, and yet there are clear indications that similar evolutions are taking place elsewhere in Europe, influenced by similar mechanisms. We believe the development of Dutch environmental policy from the 1990s onwards has been particularly influenced by the institutionalisation of these 'interference zones' between state and civil society, and between state and market. We will label and analyse the former as the '*societalisation of environmental politics*', and the latter as the '*marketisation of environmental politics*'. Both '*societalisation*' and '*marketisation*' have their impact on the types of governance and, more specifically within this context, upon the form of political participation in environmental politics. In general they imply a change from 'constitutionally institutional-

ised' and supplementary forms of participation (typical for early- and anti-modernist politics) to more deliberative and reflexive forms of participation.

4.1 'Societalisation' of environmental politics: consequences for governance and participation

The *societalisation* of environmental politics refers to politics and types of governance as a result of the institutionalisation of the 'interference zone' between state and civil society. Where the rationales of state and civil society come together, they affect policy making, governance and participation. More specifically, in this 'interference zone' rule-directed and rule-altering arrangements intermingle, leading to a diversity of policy arrangements.

From the state's perspective, the *societalisation* of environmental politics implies innovation in rule-directed instruments, and particularly in the design and implementation of communicative instruments. They are thought to enlarge both the (organising rather than steering) capacity of the state and its legitimacy on the one hand, and to co-ordinate the role of the state in relation to the interests of societal actors on the other. This means that citizens and interest groups not only have the opportunity to influence policy reactively, but are invited to communicate pro-actively about policy proposals in the different stages of policy making, ranging from the formulation of views and problems to the implementation of policy.

From the perspective of civil society, the *societalisation* of environmental politics implies a change in the patterns of governance, including rule-altering arrangements. These rule-altering arrangements, reflecting the principles of self-governance, vary from policy networks management, to co-production and interactive policy making. Network management and co-production are processes aimed at collective image building, to realise a shared understanding among stakeholders. Based upon criteria such as representativeness, authority and diversity, stakeholders are selected to be partners in a negotiating policy process, the aim of which is to gain support and to realise shared definitions of the situation (Bekkers, 1996; Leroy and Van Tatenhove, 2000). The variety of forms of interactive policy making currently experimented with all over Europe, represents a 'family' of non-codified political practices in which citizens' associations and government agencies congregate to discuss politics in the early stages of policy making (Akkerman, Hajer and Grin, 2000: 3).

This *societalisation* of environmental politics, conceived as a mix of rule-directed and rule-altering arrangements, has several consequences for the meaning and practices of political participation. Firstly, the innovation of rule-directed (communicative) instruments is supplementary to official formal procedures of participation. The aim is to inform relevant actors as soon as possible in the consecutive stages of policy making. This type of participation, however, does not change the rules of policy making and hardly affects the balances of

power between the state and the civil society representatives. Secondly, as a result of the development and institutionalisation of rule-altering arrangements, participation increasingly affects the rules of the game itself and the balances of power between actors. According to Gibbins and Reimer (1999: 113) interest groups and citizens develop a style of politics that embraces performativity, a set of rhetorical practices that encourages open dialogue, discussion, dissension and the sharing of information, and politicisation, the process by which previously excluded issues are brought into politics. Compared with the participation practices of the 1970s, these rule-altering arrangements show some striking differences. The experiments with participatory and interactive policy-making particularly add new policy arrangements to the existing legislative framework, co-existing side-by-side with rule-directed arrangements. A characteristic feature of these new arrangements is that citizens and interest groups are actively involved in the definition of problems and their solutions, and that they can make their competence the object of a mutual learning process. In the Netherlands there are several examples of integrative regional planning in environmental policy. In these projects actors have the possibility to change the rules of the game and are given the opportunity to mobilise resources, in order to formulate views and measures that do justice to local circumstances (Janssens and Van Tatenhove, 2000: 167–170).

4.2. 'Marketisation' of environmental politics: consequences for governance and participation

The *marketisation* of environmental politics refers to the emergence of rule-directed and rule-altering arrangements in the 'interference zone' between state and market. In this zone the rationales of the state and the market intermingle, thereby also affecting policy making, governance and participation.

From the perspective of the state, there is a shift from state initiated regulation to economic instruments and types of government. Rejecting the radical anti-modern discourses and accepting the much more moderate ones on 'ecological modernisation' (Mol, 1995; Spaargaren, 1997), governments aim at pricing the environment as a common good. These efforts have resulted in a variety of economic instruments, varying from the more traditional (such as taxes, levies and subsidies), to more sophisticated and innovative ones (such as the bubble concept, tradeable emission permits etc.). The plea for economic instruments was based on normative arguments (bringing into practice 'the polluter pays' principle) as well as on functional arguments (economic instruments are expected to be more effective, since taxes and subsidies influence the weighting up of behavioural alternatives by appealing to self-interest). Other examples of rule-directed *marketisation* refer to the delegation of responsibilities and competencies towards either autonomous or privatised agencies. In environmental policy domains like energy, water management and waste management, privatisation

is an important development. Within these arrangements 'the market' sets the rules and structures the relevant coalitions in terms of producer-consumer relationships. Apart from examples of mere privatisation, the *marketisation* of environmental policies, both in the Netherlands and at the European level, results in a rather neo-corporatist arrangement with the gradual institutionalisation of a so-called 'target group policy'. Target groups at first were defined as more or less homogeneous groups of polluters, such as agriculture, traffic and transport, industry and refineries, gas and electric supply. Since they are responsible for particular environmental pressures, they represented particular objects of (the state's) environmental policies. But later, the state invited them to take their share of responsibility and internalise that by being co-responsible for the setting of environmental standards and their actual implementation by the members of their particular branch of economic activities. This latter arrangement leads to a sharing of responsibilities and political authority by the state and the acknowledged industrial organisations in these policy sectors.

From the perspective of the market, several innovative policy arrangements can be distinguished, based on the intermingling of rule-directed and rule-altering politics. A first example of innovative policy arrangements are covenants and flexible policy instruments. Flexible instruments, such as Joint Implementation, the Clean Development Mechanism, and Tradeable Emissions Permits and Benchmarking, refer to a set of innovative policy mechanisms aiming at reducing greenhouse gas emissions other than through a general and common target and timetable which is imposed on all countries (Arts, 2000: 125). Covenants are voluntary agreements between the state and market parties by which producers freely adopt certain standards or targets, under the guidance of the state. Recently, a new type of covenant has emerged in environmental politics: the co-operation between civil society representatives and market agencies. Examples of these rule-altering arrangements are: the initiative of Greenpeace and the Swiss firm Wenko AG to produce the Smile (an energy extensive car); the conservation of nature in Central America by McDonalds, Conservation International and local NGOs; the initiative of Unilever and WWF to safeguard global fish stocks. Another example of rule-altering arrangements in the interference zone between 'civil society and market' is the changing nature of providers/consumers relations due to the development of green electricity and the liberalisation of the energy sector. The opening of the electricity grid to third parties resulted in a differentiation of providers (wind energy associations, NGOs or local communities). Private, public-private and self-provided types of arrangements are now joining the statist arrangements of electricity provision (see Van Vliet, Wüstenhagen and Chappels, 2000; Arts and Van Tatenhove, 2002). In Schönau, for example, citizens who felt trapped in the monopolist electricity network bought themselves out to be freed from the forced consumption of nuclear generated electricity (<http://www.ews-schoenau.de>). They started their own energy company (EWS), which then developed into a 'normal' utility.

EWS is owner of a local grid, generates and distributes electricity with additional demand-side and peak load management tasks, and has now even entered the national electricity market with the '*Watt Ihr Volt*' product (Van Vliet et al., 2000). A characteristic feature of these kinds of initiatives is that captive consumers become citizen-consumers and even participants, who have not only the possibility of choosing between different kinds of energy, but also of choosing between different suppliers or becoming a supplier themselves. As in the case of the new types of covenants between market and civil society representatives, citizens, firms and NGOs define the rules of the game and the predominant policy discourses, resulting in the renewal of politics.

5. ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS AND PARTICIPATION: DISCUSSION

This article has focused on the dynamics of environmental politics, and especially on the relation between the predominant style of governance and policy making on the one hand, and the organisation of political participation on the other. In order to understand this relationship we introduced the concepts of political modernisation and policy arrangements. We distinguished three ideal-typical types of political modernisation, respectively labelled as early-, anti- and late-modernisation. These three categories refer to basic discourses on politics, democracy and governance, relate to distinctive interrelations between state, market and civil society, and therefore lead to quite different policy arrangements. While there has clearly been a gradual change in western politics and society from early- to late-modernisation, the different categories also represent the contemporary variety in politics, in which early-modern features stand next to late-modern ones.

We believe that these political changes relate to a series of developments in the substantial and organisational aspects of environmental policy, which we have discussed elsewhere (Van Tatenhove, Arts and Leroy, 2000). Here, we restricted our discussion to the effects of these political changes upon the discourses and practices on political participation. This issue, it was made clear, was inextricably linked to environmental politics.

However closely linked 'environment' and participation' might be, their relation differs substantially over the various stages of the institutionalisation of environmental politics. In the formative years of environmental policies the practices of participation clearly reflected early modernisation: environmental policies were, albeit to a restricted extent, the object of classical, legal procedures by which citizens could express their opinions on applications for permits and on other specific issues. As these procedures proved not to provide sufficient influence, the emergent environmental movement severely criticised them as a part of their anti-modernist protest. This led to the complementing of these constitutional facilities by a series of measures to increase political openness,

primarily with regard to state–citizen interrelations. The overall impression is that these enlarged opportunities for political participation did not alter nor affect the existing power balances substantially, particularly as far as private agencies were concerned.

From the late 1980s, we witness the emergence of new discourses and practices on participation, reflecting more fundamental changes between state, market and civil society, and particularly enabling interrelations and institutionalising interference zones between them. The gradual *societalisation* and *marketisation* of environmental policies has given rise to new mechanisms and opportunities for political participation. These latter innovations are experimental in character and, therefore, have not been institutionalised hitherto, nor can they be fully assessed as to their added value in terms of participation and power. Nevertheless, both *societalisation* and *marketisation* seem to imply more of a rule-altering potential, in that both civil society and market representatives are invited not only to bring in their points of view, but also to take their share of responsibility in the policy-making and the implementation process. In this way *societalisation* and *marketisation* represent the widening of the political sphere, far beyond that of the state's institutions, thereby confirming the *de facto* political roles of the representatives of both market and society.

However, questions can be raised about the consequences of *societalisation* for participation. Compared with the participation practices of the 1970s, the 1990s show the emergence of innovative and reflexive policy arrangements, in which citizens and interest groups are actively involved in defining problems, formulating solutions and changing the rules of the game. But, what is or will be the status of a reached consensus, resulting from deliberations and negotiations between citizens and state representatives in several domains of environmental policy? Will that consensus be taken over by the constitutional bodies, thereby replacing the policies formulated so far, or will it be treated as advice, complementing the insights that constitutional bodies have to take into account when making decisions? Some actual conflicts, e.g. on how to interpret and accommodate the outcomes of local participatory processes at different levels and in different domains of environmental policy in the Netherlands make clear that these experiments provoke new fundamental political questions about the nature of democracy (models) and participation.

In a similar way, the consequences of *marketisation* for participation are not unambiguous. One should distinguish here between producers and consumers and the different participation roles they might be taking. For both consumers and producers political responsibilities and market regularities intermingle. First, their access to the state is different. While consumers are hardly organised, producers such as the chemical industry are structured in branch organisations. Their intermediary organisations have regular consultation with governmental representatives. As to the consumers, their participation role is ambivalent, based mainly on the principle of the *homo economicus*, but also upon the

principle of the *homo politicus*. As a consequence, citizens/consumers participate in diffused, if not contradictory, ways in environmental politics. On the one hand participation is oriented at the state to realise the greening of production and consumption, for example by eco-labelling. This kind of participation is based upon long-lasting and rule-directed strategies. On the other hand consumers and their organisations try in several ways to influence processes of production directly, ranging from buying eco-products to become producers themselves. Here participation is more diffused, consisting of a mix of rule-directed and rule-altering participation strategies. However, these strategies are hardly organised and still not often acknowledged by either governments or producers. In short: consumers, as *homines economici*, are asked to buy eco-products based on (a state initiated) eco-labelling, but their influence on which products deserve the predicate 'eco' is very limited, if not nil. The influence of consumers as *homines politici*, in rule-altering strategies in which consumers become producers or try to influence economic decisions directly, is still very limited. Nevertheless, both the *societalisation* and *marketisation* of environmental policies call for new opportunities and for new institutions for political participation. In that sense, they might not only indicate political changes but also catalyse them.

REFERENCES

- Alexander, J.C. (1995). *Fin de Siècle Social Theory. Relativism, Reduction, and the Problem of Reason*. London/New York: Verso.
- Akkerman, T., M. Hajer and J. Grin (2000). 'Interactive Policy Making as Deliberative Democracy? Learning from New Policy-making Practices in Amsterdam'. Paper at the Convention of the American Political Science Association, 31 August–3 September 2000, Washington DC.
- Arts, B. and M. van der Zouwen (1999). 'Policy Arrangements in Nature Conservation. The Case of the Netherlands in the European Context'. *The 1999 European Environment Conference. Environmental Policy in Europe: Visions for the New Millennium. Conference Proceedings*. London: ERP Environment, pp. 1–10.
- Arts, B. (2000). 'Global Environmental Policies: Between "Interstatist" and "Transnational" Arrangements', in J. van Tatenhove, B. Arts and P. Leroy (eds), *Political Modernisation and the Environment. The Renewal of Environmental Policy Arrangements*. Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 117–143.
- Arts, B. and J. van Tatenhove (2000). 'Power and Policy. Policy Arrangements and Shifting Power Relations, Positions and Structures'. Paper presented at panel 2, RC 36 on power at the IPSA Conference, Quebec, 1–5 August 2000.
- Arts, B. and J. van Tatenhove (2002). 'Institutional Innovation and the Environment: the Interplay between "Frontstage" and "Backstage" Politics', *GAIA*, 11(1): 64–5.
- Beck, U. (1994). 'The Reinvention of Politics: Towards a Theory of Reflexive Modernization', in U. Beck, A. Giddens and S. Lash (eds), *Reflexive Modernization. Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order*. Oxford: Polity Press, pp. 1–55.

- Beck, U. (1996). 'World Risk Society as Cosmopolitan Society? Ecological Questions in a Framework of Manufactured Uncertainties', *Theory, Culture and Society*, **13**(4): 1–32.
- Bekkers, V.J.J.M. (1996). 'Coproductie in het milieubeleid', *Bestuurswetenschappen*, **3**: 177–194.
- Blowers, A. (1984). *Something in the Air: Corporate Power and the Environment*. London: Harper and Row.
- Blowers, A. and P. Leroy (1994). 'Power, Politics and Environmental Inequality', *Environmental Politics*, **3**(2): 197–228.
- Boehmer-Christiansen, S. and J. Skea (1991). *Acid Politics. Environmental and Energy Policies in Britain and Germany*. London, New York: Belhaven Press.
- Cohen, J. (1998). 'Democracy and Liberty', in Jon Elster (ed.), *Deliberative Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 185–231.
- Franklin, J. (ed.) (1998). *Politics of Risk Society*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Gibbins, J.R. and B. Reimer (1999). *The Politics of Postmodernity. An Introduction to Contemporary Politics and Culture*. London: Sage.
- Giddens, A. (1990). *The Consequences of Modernity*. Oxford: Polity Press.
- Gladwin, T.N. (1980). Patterns of Environmental Conflict over Industrial Facilities in the United States, 1970–1980', *Natural Resources Journal*, **20**(2): 243–274.
- Gould, K.A., A. Schnaiberg and A.S. Weinberg (1996). *Local Environmental Struggles*. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Hajer, M.A. (1997). *The Politics of Environmental Discourse: Ecological Modernization and the Policy Process*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hajer, M. and H. Wagenaar (eds) (2003). *Deliberative Policy Analysis: Understanding Governance in the Network Society*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Held, D. (1989). *Political Theory and the Modern State. Essays on State, Power and Democracy*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Held, D. (1996). *Models of Democracy*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Hirst, Paul (2000). 'Democracy and Governance', in J. Pierre (ed.) *Debating Governance: Authority, Steering and Democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 13–35.
- Huberts, L.W. (1988). *De politieke invloed van protest en pressie – Besluitvormingsprocessen over rijkswegen*. Leiden.
- Janssens, J. and J. van Tatenhove (2000). 'Green Planning: From Sectoral to Integrative Planning Arrangements?', in J. van Tatenhove, B. Arts and P. Leroy (eds), *Political Modernisation and the Environment. The Renewal of Environmental Policy Arrangements*. Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp.145–174.
- Lauwers, J. (1983). 'Het groene ongenoegen', *Tijdschrift voor Sociologie*, **4**: 431–49.
- Leroy, P. (1979). *Kernenergie: milieuconflict of godsdienstoorlog?* Antwerpen/Leuven.
- Leroy, P. and J. van Tatenhove (2000). 'Political Modernization Theory and Environmental Politics', in Gert Spaargaren, Arthur P.J. Mol and Frederick H. Buttel (eds), *Environment and Global Modernity*. London: Sage, pp.187–208.
- Lowe, P. (1983). *Environmental Groups in Politics*. London: Allan and Unwin.
- Mol, A.P.J. (1995). *The Refinement of Production. Ecological Modernization Theory and the Chemical Industry*. Utrecht: Van Arkel.
- Offe, C. (1999). 'How Can we Trust our Fellow Citizens?', in M.E. Warren (ed.), *Democracy and Trust*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 42–87.

- Pestman, P. (2000). 'Dutch Infrastructure Policies: Changing and Contradictory Policy Arrangements', in J. van Tatenhove, B. Arts and P. Leroy (eds), *Political Modernisation and the Environment. The Renewal of Environmental Policy Arrangements*. Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 71–96.
- Pierre, J. (ed.) (2000). *Debating Governance. Authority, Steering and Democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Sbragia, Alberta (2000). 'The European Union as Coxswain: Governance by Steering', in J. Pierre (ed.), *Debating Governance. Authority, Steering and Democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.217–240.
- Spaargaren, G. (1997). *The Ecological Modernization of Production and Consumption. Essays in Environmental Sociology*. Wageningen: WAU.
- Van Tatenhove, J. (1999). 'Political Modernisation and the Institutionalisation of Environmental Policy', in M. Wissenburg, G. Orhan and U. Collier (eds), *European Discourses on Environmental Policy*. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 59–78.
- Van Tatenhove, J., B. Arts and P. Leroy (eds) (2000). *Political Modernisation and the Environment. The Renewal of Environmental Policy Arrangements*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
- Van Vliet, B., R. Wüstenhagen and H. Chappells (2000). 'New Provider–Consumer Relations in the Electricity Schemes in the UK, The Netherlands, Switzerland and Germany'. Paper for the Business Strategy and the Environment Conference, September 18–19, 2000, Leeds
- Warren, M. E. (ed.) (1999). *Democracy and Trust*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Weale, A. (1992). *The New Politics of Pollution*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.