



Environment & Society



White Horse Press

Full citation:

Chapman, Anne. "The Ways That Nature Matters: The World and the Earth in the Thought of Hannah Arendt."

Environmental Values 16, no. 4, (2007): 433-445.

<http://www.environmentandsociety.org/node/6013>

Rights:

All rights reserved. © The White Horse Press 2007. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purpose of criticism or review, no part of this article may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical or other means, including photocopying or recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the publisher. For further information please see <http://www.whpress.co.uk/>

The Ways That Nature Matters:
The World and the Earth in the Thought of Hannah
Arendt

ANNE CHAPMAN

*12a Derwent Road
Lancaster, LA1 3ES, UK
Email: anne.chapman@cleanmail.org.uk*

ABSTRACT

One of the many sets of distinctions made by Hannah Arendt was that between the world and the earth. I give two different interpretations of this distinction then set out four different ways in which nature matters to us, depending on whether nature is regarded as world or as earth, and whether humans are seen as biological beings or as beings who create and inhabit a world. These different ways are represented in different forms of environmentalism and theories of environmental ethics. The controversy over wind farms in the UK as an instance in which two of the different ways that nature matters come into conflict with each other.

KEYWORDS

Nature, world, earth, environmental philosophy, wind farms

INTRODUCTION

Hannah Arendt is not generally considered to be an environmental philosopher. She is often regarded as reversing the normal valuation of the natural as compared with the artificial, as valuing the human constructed world rather than nature, and seeing nature as threatening that world. In this paper, however, I will seek to show how her distinction between the world and the earth helps us to understand the *different* ways in which nature matters to us, and gives rise to the various different types of environmentalism. These ways may come into conflict with each other, giving rise to disputes in which 'environmentalists' are on both sides of the argument.

The most striking contemporary debate where this is the case is that around wind farms in the UK. Proposals to put wind turbines in many UK upland areas have provoked strong opposition from many who would call themselves lovers of nature. Equally strong has been the support for these proposals from environmentalists who would normally oppose developments in the countryside. For supporters of wind energy the key issue is that our current consumption of fossil fuel is increasing the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, which will cause catastrophic changes to our climate. In the face of this it is imperative that we reduce our consumption of fossil fuels by, amongst other things, developing renewable sources of energy, including wind power. Thus the Greenpeace website states that:

As one of the windiest countries in Europe, the UK is ideally situated to harness the power of the wind, through the use of wind turbines. Just by building wind turbines at sea, we could generate three times as much electricity as we need. And unlike conventional fossil fuels and nuclear power, wind turbines do not produce dangerous waste or contribute to global warming. (www.greenpeace.org.uk/gp_wind_solar/wind_turbines.cfm)

Friends of the Earth have likewise argued in favour of wind farms. In a press release issued in July 2004 they argued that 'Wind farms are essential if we are going to tackle the very real threat of climate change – the biggest challenge this planet faces' (see www.foe.co.uk).

In contrast, for opponents of wind farms, protection of 'the environment' means the preservation of valued aspects of the British countryside – its beauty, wildness and tranquillity – which we have inherited from our forebears and should safeguard for the future. The Chairman of Country Guardian, one of the key anti-wind farm groups in the UK states that:

Country Guardian does not claim to be able to solve our energy problems but it would be folly to sacrifice our heritage and few remaining precious landscapes for a scientific theory [the theory that emissions of carbon dioxide from burning fossil fuels are causing global warming – AC] which is still being debated worldwide. ... We have inherited the timeless beauty of these landscapes from

THE WAYS THAT NATURE MATTERS

our forebears and we recognise our duty to safeguard their peace and serenity for future generations. If we proceed with the present policy for on-shore commercial wind 'farms' future generations will be amazed that we overwhelmed the landscape with such a pointless and destructive response to the challenge of reducing pollution in our atmosphere. (Kelly, 2000)

In this paper I argue that the anti-wind farm campaigners are concerned about nature 'as world' whereas those in favour of wind farms see them as essential to protect nature 'as earth'. In the conclusion I argue that priority should be given to protecting nature as earth.

The distinction between the world and the earth does not receive a great deal of attention in Arendt's work, nor in the secondary literature.¹ Giving an account of it is thus a matter of piecing together the various clues she gives in scattered remarks, with the help of some commentators on her work. In the following I first present two different accounts of the world/earth distinction. Then, on the basis of these I elucidate four different ways in which nature matters to us and explain how these are represented in different types of environmentalism and theories of environmental ethics.

THE WORLD AND THE EARTH

The world is a very important concept in the thought of Hannah Arendt. What she means by it is not everything that exists, but that which is the product of human work, as opposed to just of nature. Those products are reifications of ideas or models (Arendt, 1958: 139–144). They include institutions as well as material things such as buildings, tables and computers.

The things of the world lie between, and are thus shared by human individuals. They are thus always to some extent public: they can always, potentially at least, be experienced by more than one person and those different people have different perspectives on and opinions about them. Arendt talks of the things of the world both separating and relating individuals, as a table both separates and relates those who sit around it (Arendt, 1958: 52–53). It 'gathers us together and yet prevents our falling over each other, so to speak' (Arendt, 1958: 52).

The world is thus the place that human individuals inhabit with others. It gives meaning to the life of the individual and the community of which they are part. Only in the world are we unique individuals, with our moral triumphs and failings. Human life in the sense of what takes place between the birth and death of an individual is always in the context of a human-created world (Arendt, 1958: 97).

To provide this context for individual life the world must outlast the individual (Arendt, 1968: 210). The individual is born into a world that they leave when they die. The world is our inheritance from the past, that we leave as a legacy to the future. It should be stable, not in the sense of never changing, but

in the sense of lasting. This may require some change, but it will be change that preserves what is significant, and that continues the story of the past into the future in a meaningful way.²

In contrast to the world, built by human work, the earth is the natural environment, in which we live as other animals do. The earth is the totality of life, along with the rocks and soils, the seas and the air. It provides the materials with which we build a world. In the short term (i.e. from the 'human in the world' perspective), the earth is characterised by constant cyclical movement. It

moves in endless cycles of growth and decay, one generation of animals or plants replacing the previous generation in a natural movement that is indifferent to individual specimens. (Canovan, 1992: 106)

As far as the earth is concerned it no more matters that the individual people alive now are different from those alive 100 years ago, than that the ants I find in my garden this year are different individuals from the ones that were there last year. Whereas in the world we are each a unique, individual person, on the earth we are all simply members of the same species. Our differences are matters of variations in biology, not matters of personal identity or moral excellence. Hence 'death is no respecter of persons': the biological processes that result in the death of an individual are indifferent to the status of that individual within the human community.³ For the human individual in the world there is a linear progress from birth to death, but on the earth there is no such linearity, rather 'life goes on'. Death is simply the replacement of one form of life with another: the life of the herbivore is replaced by that of the carnivore who kills it and the scavengers who finish off the carcass; the life of the tree with that of the beetles and fungi which degrade the wood.

This distinction does, I suggest, reflect how the words 'world' and 'earth' are used in everyday language. We speak of 'building a new world' and 'changing the world', but would not talk of the earth in the same way. Organisations such as 'Earth First!' and 'Friends of the Earth' are concerned with protecting nature. 'Friends of the World' would have very different connotations.

In addition to this distinction between the world as human artefact and the earth as nature there is, I suggest, another more basic account of the distinction between the world and the earth in Arendt's thought. Here the world is that which appears, as distinct from that which is given. This account is basically Kantian: the earth is the noumena, and the world the phenomena. The link between this and the previous account is that phenomena – how things appear – are constructed by us from what is given in the noumena, just as we construct buildings with materials provided by the earth. For Kant phenomena are contingent upon our categories of thought. For neo-Kantian philosophers of science, the phenomena depend on the experimental apparatus we use to detect things: how things appear in the world depends on that world.⁴

THE WAYS THAT NATURE MATTERS

In support of this more basic distinction is Arendt's emphasis on appearance when she discusses the world. The world is always public because it is what appears to all: it can be perceived by others as well as ourselves (unlike private thoughts and feelings). She considers that what the world should look like and what kinds of things are to appear in it are matters for political decisions (Arendt, 1968: 223). This is perhaps one reason why she considers Kant's work on aesthetic judgement to be a political philosophy (Arendt, 1982). Also, she does not maintain the strict artefactual/natural distinction with regard to the world and the earth that may be suggested by the first account. Indeed, nature can be part of the world. She says, for example, that nature's processes can only be considered as growth and decay 'if we consider nature's products, this tree or this dog, as individual things, thereby already removing them from their 'natural' surroundings and putting them into our world' (Arendt, 1958: 98).

The following table summarises these two accounts.

The World	The Earth
Built by human work	Natural environment, the totality of life
Durable things, stable home, linear change	Cyclical change
Unique individuals with linear life-span	Members of a species, life goes on
That which appears – depends on our concepts of thought and on our artefacts, not only on what is given	What is given

It should be clear that in both these accounts the world and the earth are not spatially distinct from each other. All things on earth (the planet) that have material existence, in time and space, are part of the earth, whatever their genesis. A chair, as a human artefact, is clearly part of the world, but in that its material is subject to the processes of the living earth, it is part of the earth (whether made of natural materials, such as wood, or a clearly artificial one, such as plastic). All natural, non-human-created things that can appear in public (i.e. be experienced by different people, from a plurality of perspectives) have the potential to be part of our world and we make them part of our world by paying attention to them.

THE WAYS THAT NATURE MATTERS

These two accounts of the world/nature distinction give four different ways in which nature matters for human beings, that vary according to whether 'nature' is treated as world or as earth, and whether we think of ourselves as part of the earth or the world.⁵

Firstly, regarding nature as earth in the sense of the natural environment (first account) and thinking of ourselves as biological organisms who are part of the

earth, nature is obviously important because our lives (in the biological sense) depend on it. Our biological existence is sustained by and is part of the natural systems and processes of the earth, not by the world (Arendt 1958: 2). This does not, of course, mean that nature is always benign as far as the individual life is concerned. The earth is indifferent to our individuality. It sustains our life, but the processes of the earth also result in the life of the individual being extinguished at some point.

Our consumption of food and fuel is part of the (mostly) cyclical processes of the earth, but many of our current practices dislocate these cycles. We produce food in one place but discharge the waste products from its consumption (by ourselves or our livestock) in another, where they cause pollution, rather than replenish natural cycles. In burning fossil fuels, formed from vegetation that grew millions of years ago, we are stepping outside the contemporary carbon cycle, putting more and more carbon dioxide into the atmosphere at a rate much faster than current vegetation can take it out.

Human actions that threaten the functioning of natural systems, or cause them to produce very different conditions, can result in dramatic changes to the type and quantity of life a local area is able to support. Changes on a global scale may threaten the continued existence of the human species, as well as that of many others. These concerns are at the heart of the environmentalism represented by organisations such as Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, that since the 1970s have been calling for radical changes to the world – to our technology, economic institutions and practices – because of their threat to the earth. Hence, in the debate over wind farms these organisations emphasise the threat of climate change and the resulting need to change the world by the development of renewable energy, including the construction of wind farms. Within environmental philosophy this perspective is apparent in holistic theories that value the preservation of ecosystems and their functioning and that are informed by the science of ecology (for example, Callicott 1989; Marietta 1979; Johnson 1991).

Nature as earth here matters to us because we are biological organisms, but our recognition of this is always from a fully human standpoint; that is, as humans in a world, where things have meaning. On the earth individual organisms, or individual species, come and go and life simply goes on – though one day it may not, if the dynamic system maintaining the conditions for life collapses. On the earth the extinction of human life through loss of the conditions required to support it has no particular value or disvalue. But as human beings in a world that has meaning and value, we consider it a moral imperative not to bring about the extinction of human life, and the destruction of the world that would go with it.⁶ Obeying this imperative means desisting from actions that may significantly change the systems and processes of the earth away from those in which human life evolved, as we are unlikely to be able survive in substantially different conditions.

THE WAYS THAT NATURE MATTERS

Secondly, nature matters to us in the sense that it provides raw materials which we use to build a world. Here nature is earth in the first account of the distinction, but we are primarily world builders, rather than biological organisms. We thus consider ourselves in some sense external to the earth – it is a store of resources that we take from to build our world. This way that nature matters is represented in the type of conservationism that is concerned with the wise use of resources (for example, Pinchot, 1914; Hays, 1959).

Arendt considers that this taking always involves doing violence to the earth: the cyclical processes of the earth are interrupted when we fell trees or mine ores. The earth is also an antagonist that we have to contend with to preserve the world: the cyclical movements of the earth – of life – pervade the world, and unless it is cared for by the labour of cleaning, repair and maintenance, life ‘uses up’ the durability of the world, returning worldly things to the cycle of the earth (Arendt, 1958: 96). Thus the chair becomes wood and the wood decays and returns to the soil (Arendt, 1958: 137). We have to halt natural processes to keep the world as it is. Unlike in the first way that nature matters there is here some opposition between human interests (in building and preserving a world) and natural processes.

Thirdly, the appearances of natural things are part of the human world. These aspects of nature matter to us in the same way that the world that we build matters, as a home for human life. In some sense this ‘nature as world’ draws on the second account of the world/earth distinction, where world is that which appears. However, in many cases the appearance of nature – the landscape, significant trees – is partly an outcome of past human activity, so can be regarded as ‘world’ in the first sense. We can tell a story about human actions that explains how they have come to be as they are. They are part of our inheritance from past generations of humans, and our legacy for the future. However, even if they are not the product of human work, landscapes, rivers, mountains and trees, are part of our world in the sense that they pre-exist and outlast us.⁷ One could indeed argue that in building a world of lasting human artefacts we are attempting to emulate this immortality of nature. Like the human-constructed world, the natural objects that form part of our world may gather us together, relating and separating us, and be important for the identity of individuals and communities. Nature here is not something we are part of, as we are part of the earth in the first way that nature matters. The relationship we each have with nature as world is not one of a part to a whole, rather nature provides a context for the life of the self with others, a context that is external to the self. Nature as world is the place that we inhabit, but we can move to another place.

Nature in this sense is what ‘nature conservation’ organisations, such as the World Wildlife Fund, and the UK Wildlife Trusts, have traditionally sought to preserve. Their concern is the preservation of particular places, organisms or species: things that make up part of the (natural) world that we have inherited, which we should pass on to future generations, just as we inherit and pass on

great works of art and buildings. The focus of this type of nature conservation is the preservation of things that appear in the world, not the maintenance of systems and processes. Hence the problem that holistic theories of environmental ethics, that locate value in the functioning of ecological systems (that see nature as earth), cannot justify preservation of rare species. Such species, because they are so rare, are no longer integral parts of ecosystems (Katz, 1997: 19; Russow, 1981), but they are part of the world.

When anti-windfarm campaigners speak of the ‘timeless beauty of these landscapes’ that we have inherited from our forebears, and whose ‘peace and serenity’ it is our duty to safeguard for future generations (Kelly, 2000) it is clear that the nature they seek to preserve is nature as world.

Because natural entities are part of our world they have the same sort of value as cultural artefacts do. That we should value nature in this way, as opposed to the way in which we value individual human beings, was argued by Kerry Whiteside in an article in *Environmental Values* (Whiteside, 1998). He points out that the criteria we use to judge natural systems, such as integrity, beauty and stability are qualities that can also be applied to judging works of art, whereas they are not appropriate categories for thinking about the intrinsic worth of human beings. Whiteside draws on Arendt’s discussion of culture in ‘The Crisis in Culture’ (Arendt, 1968). Here she says that culture is ‘the mode of intercourse of man with the things of the world’ (Arendt, 1968: 213), but argues that the roots of the term lie in an attitude to nature:

The word ‘culture’ derives from *colere* – to cultivate, to dwell, to take care, to tend and preserve – and it relates primarily to the intercourse of man with nature in the sense of cultivating and tending nature until it becomes fit for human habitation. As such, it indicates an attitude of loving care and stands in sharp contrast to all efforts to subject nature to the domination of man. (Arendt, 1968: 212)

Thus Whiteside argues that Arendt’s work provides the basis for an environmental ethic in which nature is to be valued and cared for in the same way as we care for works of art and other cultural objects.

There may be problems, however, with this type of valuing of nature. This is that our need for a durable, stable world leads to us wanting to keep natural things the same over time. We therefore sometimes resent, or resist changes caused to those things by natural processes – for as part of the earth ‘nature’ is forever changing. In most cases, of course, the rate of change is far longer than the human lifespan, so nature ‘as world’ appears stable. However, in some environments dramatic changes may happen over short periods of time. For example, the river channels in the tidal sands of Morecambe Bay, in North West England, can move significantly over just a few years. Recent movement of a river channel away from the north side of the bay has led to the growth of salt marsh grasses where there was previously sand. At one place where this has

THE WAYS THAT NATURE MATTERS

happened, Grange-over-Sands, there have been moves to resist this change and stop the growth of the colonising grasses.⁸

The animal rights movement and systems of environmental ethics that locate value in individual entities (Regan, 1983; Singer, 1990; Taylor, 1986; Goodpaster, 1978) also seem to have a view of nature 'as world'.⁹ For, as Arendt points out, when we regard organisms as individuals we bring them into our world (Arendt, 1958: 98). We regard them as we regard our fellow human individuals, and wish to accord them rights, or prevent their pain and suffering: to give them the same sort of moral consideration that we give to fellow human beings. Concepts such as the well-being of the individual, its pain, pleasure and death, only make sense in the context of the world. On the earth there is simply life: a dynamic, ever-changing process, that can take a huge variety of forms.

Fourthly, nature is what is given from outside humanity. This is nature as earth in the second account of the world/earth distinction, but humans are external to it. Here nature matters because it is not constructed by humans; the very opposite almost of the third way that nature matters. This way that nature matters is at the heart of much non-anthropocentric environmental philosophy. For example, Bill McKibben states that 'Nature's independence *is* its meaning: without it there is nothing but us' (McKibben, 1989: 58) and for him the fact that we have changed such a fundamental thing as the climate signifies 'the end of nature': 'every spot on the earth is man-made and artificial' (McKibben, 1989: 59). Why is it important for there to be something other than us? Why should we not try to replace natural systems and processes with human-created ones, freeing ourselves from dependence on the earth (the first way that nature matters) by completely replacing the earth with a human-constructed world? The answer that our relation to natural processes 'help to 'locate the self' in a deep psychological sense that matters enormously to people' (Goodin, 1992: 39) does not seem to be sufficient. The argument that nature's independence makes it of 'intrinsic value' (see for example Katz, 1997) in fact merely moves the problem to why humans should recognise and respect this 'intrinsic value', and it implies that products of human work, the world, have only instrumental value.

Arendt did not live to see this debate. However, I suggest that she left some pointers to an answer in her emphasis on the givenness of life. For Arendt, human existence is something that has been given, 'a free gift from nowhere (secularly speaking)' (Arendt, 1958: 2–3). She sees the exploration of space (she was writing at the time of the first satellites) and the 'attempt to create life in the test tube' (Arendt, 1958: 2) as attempts to escape from the constraints imposed by our existence as biological beings, whose lives are part of the earth. They are attempts to make life 'artificial' and she sees such attempts as 'a rebellion against human existence as it has been given' (Arendt, 1958: 2). In contrast, gratitude for the life we have been given is what enables us to face death. In notes made in 1963 in the margins of a draft translation of her doctoral disserta-

tion, *The Concept of Love in St Augustine*, when she was intending to revise it for publication, Arendt wrote:

Fear of death, and the inadequacy of life are the springs of desire, whereas, on the contrary, gratitude for life having been given at all – a life cherished even in misery – ... is the spring of remembrance. What ultimately stills the fear of death is not hope or desire but remembrance and gratitude. (Young-Bruehl, 1982: 494)

The concept of gratitude in Arendt's thought is discussed by Kateb:

the substratum of Arendt's thought on the human and individual is a composite feeling: *wonder* at the fact that there is something rather than nothing, and *gratitude* for the beauty of the world (in a special sense of beauty). (Kateb, 1983: 165)

According to Kateb wonder and gratitude are Arendt's remedies for the resentment against the conditions of human existence that is the source of modern alienation. However, from what Kateb says about Arendt's thoughts on gratitude, it seems more appropriate to apply it to the earth than, as he suggests, to the world. For example, he quotes a letter that Arendt wrote to Gershom Scholem in July 1963 in which she says:

There is such a thing as a basic gratitude for everything that is as it is; for what has been given and was not, could not be, *made*, for things that are *physei* and not *nomoi*. (quoted in Kateb, 1983: 166)

Arendt is thus talking about gratitude for things that are as they are by nature (*i.e.* the earth), as opposed to being made by human beings, as laws (*nomoi*) are made (and are thus part of the world). Kateb also points out that although much of Arendt's talk about gratitude emphasises acceptance, she does not propose passivity, rather 'what is changeable certainly should be changed' (Kateb, 1983: 167). Gratitude for the earth can be accompanied by a commitment to change the world.

Of course Arendt was not concerned with how to justify a non-anthropocentric environmental ethics. However, I suggest that if we accept what she says about the importance of gratitude in human life it does provide an argument for why nature untouched by humans should matter to us. This is because it makes possible a certain type of gratitude. In contrast to gratitude for what other people have provided us with, which is always dependent on a judgement that those people have acted in the right way towards us, gratitude for the earth is unconditional: what we have been given, or not given, does not depend on our actions (the sun shines on the just and the unjust alike) or on the actions of anyone who is accountable to us. If we did manage to replace the given earth with a human-constructed world we would lose the possibility of this sort of gratitude. Gratitude for the earth involves recognising the non-human origin of nature and the value of the earth as it is, unmodified by human work. It implies

THE WAYS THAT NATURE MATTERS

an attention to nature that welcomes what we find there, as opposed to an attempt to make nature into something that conforms to our ideas of how things should be, without regard to how things are as they are given.

CONCLUSION

Arendt's categories of the world and the earth provide a way of understanding the different forms of environmentalism, and the various meanings of nature in human life. They explain the different ways in which nature matters to us: it is the earth which we are part of, as all other biological organisms are; it is the source of raw materials for building a world; natural things form part of that world, and finally, nature is that which is given from outside humanity, without which unconditional gratitude would not be possible.

However, they also shed light on how nature can be our antagonist. Firstly, nature as earth is indifferent to our individual life, which, like that of all other individuals, is always vulnerable to being extinguished. Secondly, the continual movement of nature as earth, in which life colonises whatever is available to it, incorporating that matter into the life process and thereby transforming it, threatens the durability of the human-created world. Human artefacts therefore need to be cared for (e.g. by cleaning to remove micro-organisms) to keep the processes of life at bay so that the artefacts last. Maurizio Passerin d'Entrèves considers that the category of nature in Arendt's thought is ambiguous. He says that she seems to lament both the loss of given nature through its replacement by the artificial, and the encroachment of natural processes into the world (*i.e.* its increasing naturalness and loss of stability and permanence), that results from us seeing humans primarily as biological organisms (Passerin d'Entrèves, 1994: 51–53). However, this ambiguity is resolved if we understand the complexity of the world / earth distinction and its relationship to 'nature' and the natural.

The first two ways in which nature matters do not command the emotional response that the latter two ways do, so in a sense matter to us least. But they show how nature as earth is the precondition for the existence of what we value: the existence of humanity and of the world that we build. This suggests that, despite in a sense mattering less, they are in fact more important. We should therefore give priority to not disturbing natural systems and processes by ensuring that in building and preserving our world (including the 'natural' features within it) we do not change the systems of the earth. In debates over wind farms I am thus generally on the pro-wind farm side.

NOTES

¹ Indicative of this lack of attention is the fact that a recent compilation of writing on Arendt (Williams, 2006) does not contain an index entry for 'earth'. Passerin d'Entrèves (1994: 39–42) and Kateb (1983: 159–161) both discuss Arendt's concept of 'earth alienation'. This is the modern desire to escape from the earth and refusal to recognise ourselves as earthly creatures, epitomised by the exploration of space and also by modern science's adoption of the universe, rather than the earth as its standpoint and frame of reference. They contrast earth alienation with world alienation, but do not discuss the difference between the world and the earth.

² See discussion of the stability of the world in Chapman, 2004.

³ Though there may be differences between people of different social strata, in nutrition, exposure to pollution, amount of exercise, etc., that are biologically relevant and result in differentials in life expectancy between groups of different social status.

⁴ Thus an electron appears as a wave or as a particle, depending on the apparatus used to detect it.

⁵ Note that in all these accounts I am taking a human standpoint, talking about the ways that nature matters to *us*. The question of nature's importance independent of human life and valuing seems to me to be a question we cannot answer.

⁶ For an account of why this is a moral imperative see Jonas, 1984.

⁷ However, it is interesting to note that some of our oldest trees (in the UK), that many seek to preserve as part of our heritage, have lasted as long as they have only because they have been coppiced or pollarded. According to Peter Marren an old pollarded tree is not merely a tree, it is architecture (Marren, 2004).

⁸ See fact sheet on *Spartina angelica*, the grass that is growing on the sands, produced by the Morecambe Bay Partnership (www.morecambebay.org.uk/pdf/reference/spartina-angelica.pdf) and Westmorland Gazette, 11 August 2000, 'Group fight Spartina'.

⁹ Though note that the entity that is made part of our world is the individual organism, whereas for the nature conservation organisations discussed above it is the species. Hence the frequent conflicts between the two as to what matters, the well-being of individuals or the existence of species.

REFERENCES

- Arendt, Hannah. 1958. *The Human Condition*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Arendt, Hannah. 1968. *Between Past and Future*. Viking Compass Edition with additional text.
- Arendt, Hannah. 1982. *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy*. Brighton: Harvester Press.
- Callicott, J. Baird. 1989. *In Defense of the Land Ethic*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Canovan, Margaret. 1992. *Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of her Political Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

THE WAYS THAT NATURE MATTERS

- Chapman, Anne. 2004 'Technology as world building', *Ethics, Place and Environment*, 7(1–2): 59–72. doi: 10.1080/1366879042000264778.
- Goodin, Robert E. 1992. *Green Political Theory*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Goodpaster, Kenneth. 1978. 'On being morally considerable', *Journal of Philosophy*, 75: 308–325. doi: 10.2307/2025709.
- Hays, Samuel. 1959 *Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Johnson, Lawrence E. 1991. *A Morally Deep World: An Essay on Moral Significance and Environmental Ethics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Jonas, Hans. 1984. *The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Kateb, George. 1983. *Hannah Arendt: Politics, Conscience, Evil*. Oxford: Martin Robertson.
- Katz, Eric. 1997. *Nature as Subject: Human Obligation and Natural Community*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Kelly, Angela. 2000. 'When the wind blows', *Faculty of Building Journal*. Available at www.countryguardian.net (5 July 2006)
- Marietta, Don E. Jr. 1979. 'The interrelationship of ecological science and environmental ethics', *Environmental Ethics*, 1: 195–207.
- Marren, Peter. 2004. 'Once there were giants', *The Independent Review*, Thursday 30 September.
- McKibben, Bill. 1989. *The End of Nature*. New York: Random House.
- Mill, John S. 1904. *Nature, the Utility of Religion and Theism*, London: Watts & Co.
- Passerin d'Entrèves, Maurizio. 1994. *The Political Philosophy of Hannah Arendt*. London: Routledge.
- Pinchot, Gifford. 1914. *The Training of a Forester*. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott.
- Regan, Tom. 1983. *The Case for Animal Rights*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Russow, Lilly-Marlene. 1981. 'Why do species matter?' *Environmental Ethics*, 3: 101–112.
- Singer, Peter. 1990. *Animal Liberation*, 2nd edition. New York: New York Review/Random House.
- Taylor, Paul W. 1986. *Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Whiteside, Kerry, H. 1998. 'Worldliness and respect for nature: an ecological application of Hannah Arendt's conception of culture', *Environmental Values*, 7: 25–40. doi: 10.3197/096327198129341456.
- Williams, Garrath, ed. 2006. *Hannah Arendt: Critical Assessments of Leading Political Philosophers*, 4 volume set. London: Routledge.
- Young-Bruehl, Elisabeth. 1982. *Hannah Arendt, for the Love of the World*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

